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RECONCILING AUTOMATIC AND CONDITIONAL 
IMMIGRANT NATURALISATION 
 
ABSTRACT: Discussions within political theory on naturalisation tend to focus on 
whether or not it is reasonable and fair to make naturalisation conditional on meeting 
integration requirements. Those who emphasize the right of long-term immigrants to 
be included as equal citizens argue that automatic naturalisation is preferable, while 
those who put emphasis on the state’s legitimate interest in promoting the conditions 
for a reasonably just society tend to argue that conditional naturalisation is 
normatively preferable. However, most participating in this debate seem to agree that 
naturalisation rules must balance these different concerns. In this paper, we argue that 
the conflicting views on each side of the automatic-conditional divide can be 
reconciled by introducing the model of discounting-conditional naturalisation. We 
suggest that a practice in which integration requirements are gradually relaxed over 
time can in fact sufficiently accommodate those normative considerations that are in 
conflict under the current practices.  
 
KEY WORDS: Naturalisation; integration requirements; democracy; social cohesion; 




Since the mid- to late 1990s, Western states have increasingly conditioned access to 
permanent residence and citizenship on meeting certain requirements regarding 
employment, language proficiency, and knowledge of the host country (Goodman, 
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2014). Most Western countries now use integration requirements in one form or 
another to actively shape immigrants into good citizens or measure desert. At least 
initially, the political intention behind these measures was to promote the integration 
and participation of immigrants. Yet in some national contexts, such as the Danish or 
Austrian where the requirements have become particularly demanding (if not 
onerous), the intent is now as much about civic selection, i.e., screening out those who 
are undeserving (or even deterring them from ever entering the country), as it is about 
civic integration (Jensen, Fernandéz and Brochmann, 2017; Perchinig, 2010). 
Discussions within political theory on immigrant naturalisation tend to 
focus on whether it is reasonable and fair to block automatic access to citizenship – be 
it voluntary or mandatory – for long-term resident immigrants and refugees. That is, is 
it reasonable and fair to make naturalisation conditional on fulfilling requirements 
regarding employment, income, language, and/or knowledge of society, as most 
Western countries do today? The main arguments in this debate point either to long-
term immigrants having a right to naturalise or long-term immigrants having a duty to 
adapt. Andrew Mason concisely points to how this debate speaks to a tension within 
justice ‘between a long-term resident’s just entitlement to citizenship and promoting 
the conditions for a reasonably just society’ (Mason, 2014: 145). He further argues 
that the injustice involved in making citizenship conditional on certain integration 
requirements ‘becomes less objectionable as a result of occurring within a process that 
aims at inclusion’ (Mason, 2014: 148). If one accepts both right-based and duty-based 
arguments as justified, the challenge is to find a policy approach that can alleviate this 
tension and incorporate integration requirements into an inclusionary process.  
Indeed, most accept that there are good arguments both for making 
immigrant naturalisation automatic and for requiring some form and degree of 
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adaptation. However, neither automatic nor conditional naturalisation offers a solution 
for how to incorporate integration requirements into an inherently inclusionary 
naturalisation process. Consequently, the debate finds itself in a deadlock. We argue 
that this is unnecessary; that it is possible to rethink the practice of naturalisation and 
embed integration requirements in a process that aims at inclusion. A practice in 
which integration requirements are gradually relaxed over time before finally being 
lifted is a solution that actually confronts and partially alleviates the aforementioned 
tension within justice in contrast to the practices of automatic and conditional 
naturalisation. We term this approach discounting-conditional naturalisation because 
the longer an immigrant has been resident, the weaker the integration requirements 
are for accessing permanent residence or citizenship. 
David Owen suggests something similar when he argues that ‘it is 
plausible that liberal egalitarians may accept accelerated access to national citizenship 
for those who can pass a citizenship test, what they reject is that you can make access 
to the legal status of citizenship fully conditional on passing a test’ (Owen, 2013: 
330). However, as we argue, this is only because liberal egalitarians also (partially) 
accept duty-based arguments as those liberal nationalists tend to present. Hence, 
accelerated access to those who can pass certain tests is a solution that seeks a 
reasonable middle ground by balancing rights-based and duty-based arguments. In 
this paper, we develop the blueprint for a version of such a naturalisation policy – 
discounting-conditional naturalisation – and argue that it nicely balances the generally 
accepted rights-based and duty-based arguments in the literature. 
Before moving on, the reader should note four things. Firstly, in this 
paper we focus only on immigrant naturalisation (for those immigrating legally), not 
other types or questions of citizenship acquisition. Consequently, when extrapolating 
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normative concerns from work that goes beyond immigrant naturalisation, such as 
birthright citizenship or illegal immigrants, it is only for the purpose of applying those 
concerns to immigrant naturalisation. Secondly, we distinguish between the legal act 
of naturalisation and the process of naturalisation. Regarding the latter, we understand 
naturalisation to be a process that begins at the point of taking lawful residence and 
ends with citizenship being granted (i.e., the legal act of naturalisation). Hence, 
because permanent residence is a necessary step towards receiving citizenship for 
most immigrants (e.g., there are often exemptions for persons with certain close 
ethnic or cultural ties), we take it to be a part of the naturalisation process and, thus, 
naturalisation policy. The model of naturalisation that we propose says something 
about how integration requirements ought to be incorporated into the naturalisation 
process and, thus, relates to the legal status of permanent residence as well as 
citizenship. When using the term naturalisation we refer to the process of 
naturalisation unless mentioned otherwise. Thirdly, we remain agnostic about the 
different normative arguments presented in the paper. Our aim is only to show that 
there is a common normative ground among political theorists and that our proposed 
model is a better fit for the generally accepted arguments in the literature. Finally, we 
are not discussing which kinds of naturalisation requirements are reasonable (e.g., a 
language requirement or a knowledge requirement) nor what is a reasonable sequence 
or (initial) demandingness of different integration requirements. Instead, we discuss 
the general or basic approach states adopt for the use of integration requirements in 
the naturalisation process. That is, when is it reasonable to use naturalisation 
requirements to guard access to full, equal citizenship? 
The paper begins by describing the difference between automatic and 
conditional naturalisation as well as how naturalisation policies in Western 
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democracies have developed in recent decades. We then describe two generally 
accepted theses – the inclusion thesis and the adaptation thesis – and the variety of 
more specific normative reasons in the literature underlying these general theses, 
which, although widely accepted, seem to drive theorists to opposite conclusions on 
the appropriate model for naturalisation. Finally, we argue that taken together these 
ecumenical theses, and the normative reasons on which they are grounded, are more 
favourable towards discounting-conditional naturalisation than automatic or 
conditional naturalisation. 
 
AUTOMATIC AND CONDITIONAL NATURALISATION 
Arguably, permanent residence is more important than citizenship in terms of the 
rights gained. Moving from temporary to permanent residence means that one is now 
mostly free from immigration control and can live and work in a country without 
restrictions. Often, however, permanent residence can be revoked if a person is 
convicted of a serious crime or resides outside the country for a long period. 
Citizenship typically grants one the right to vote and be a candidate in national 
elections, freedom to reside outside the country indefinitely, more security from 
deportation, it carries socio-economic benefits as well as a basis for social integration 
and identification with the national community (Bloemraad, 2017; Peters and Vink, 
2016; Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono, 2015).   
Even though citizenship may be less important than permanent 
residence for immigrants, both are perceived by many political actors to hold 
significant potential for shaping how immigrants end up participating in and 
identifying with the national community. There are two notions about motivation to 
integrate at play here, which often compete in national debates (Jensen, Fernandéz 
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and Brochmann, 2017; Gerdes, Faist and Rieple, 2007). One sees these legal statuses 
as prerequisites for creating a strong motivation to integrate because they confer 
(symbolic) recognition of belonging, security and equal rights. The second notion 
emphasizes that motivation to integrate is most effectively fostered by making these 
valuable legal statuses a prize for integration. 
This difference between seeing permanent residence and citizenship as a 
prerequisite or a prize for integration aligns somewhat with the basic dispute in the 
literature on naturalisation requirements. One side argues that immigrants be granted 
automatic access to permanent residence and citizenship, either as a voluntary option 
by simple declaration or as an obligation1 (here automatic refers to both of these 
approaches), after a reasonable number of years of legal residence – which may be 
extended if one is convicted of certain crimes. Others defend making naturalisation 
conditional on fulfilling certain integration requirements regarding language, 
knowledge, employment etc. We shall refer to these as automatic naturalisation and 
conditional naturalisation, respectively. The difference pertains to whether the 
applicant must meet certain requirements besides legal residence in order to receive 
permanent residence and citizenship.  
Importantly, automatic naturalisation is not the same as unconditional 
naturalisation, but instead a practice wherein the requirements can be fulfilled with 
minimal effort. Hence, what is normally thought of as automatic naturalisation is 
really more accurately termed automatic conditional naturalisation since there are 
conditions to be fulfilled; it is just that one will fulfil them in time by simply 
refraining from acting (in any particular way) before one can apply or is given 
                                                 
1 De Schutter and Ypi (2015) argue for making naturalisation mandatory. 
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citizenship. Conversely, a policy of non-automatic conditional naturalisation entails 
that applicants, in order to receive permanent residence and citizenship, must meet 
additional requirements – on top of length of legal residence – that require a 
considerable effort to fulfil, such as participating in an integration program, learning 
the language, getting a job or learning about the norms, history, and institutions of the 
society in question. 
A policy of automatic naturalisation seems rather lost on the 
contemporary imagination of Western governments. Conditional naturalisation is the 
starting point for the vast majority of political debates, which then proceed to consider 
the type of requirements that are fair and how demanding they should be. The use of 
integration requirements in itself is seldom contested, which might be surprising since 
most Western countries had few, if any, requirements aside from length of stay before 
the reinvigoration of naturalisation policy in the mid- to late 1990s (Goodman, 2014). 
Since then, there has been a strong convergence towards making permanent residence 
and citizenship conditional on new, formalized requirements regarding employment, 
income, language and knowledge – in tandem with the increased salience of 
immigration and integration issues in national debates. These policy instruments have 
been grouped under the term ‘civic integration policies’ (Goodman, 2014; Joppke, 
2007). The Netherlands was the first country to start formalizing naturalisation 
requirements in the mid-1990s (Entzinger, 2006), but soon after, and especially 
through the 2000s, most other West European states followed suit. Today, most West 
European states have adopted formalized versions of one or more of the above-
mentioned integration requirements, albeit with variations in demandingness and 
where they are placed in the naturalisation process. Denmark, to take on example, is 
arguably the state that has implemented the most demanding requirements according 
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to the CIVIX index (Goodman 2014). Acquiring citizenship requires eight (if refugee) 
or nine years of legal residence, passing a language test at the B2 level, passing a 
citizenship test, having received unemployment benefits for no more than half a year 
within the last five years, and not having received unemployment benefits within the 
last year. Permanent residence requires eight years of stay (which can be reduced to 
four years if one is able to meet additional requirements similar to those guarding 
citizenship), passing a language test at the B1 level, not having received certain 
unemployment benefits within the last four years, being employed, and having been 
employed for at least three and a half of the last four years. Analyses indicate that 
only around a third of refugees in Denmark can accommodate the citizenship 
requirements after 12 years of residence and that poorly educated, female, and elderly 
immigrants are much less likely to reach such a state (Bech et al., 2017).  
Ireland and Sweden are, to an extent, exemptions to this general trend. 
In Sweden, immigrants can receive citizenship if they have five years of legal 
residence, a permanent residence permit and no serious criminal record. Before 2016, 
refugees and family migrants even received a permanent residence permit 
automatically at entry. Since then, however, a temporary residence permit has been 
introduced, which can be converted to a permanent residence permit after three years 
of stay if one can support oneself. In Ireland, refugees only need three years of legal 
residence and no serious criminal record in order to receive citizenship. Other 
immigrants need five years of legal residence and must not have received state 
support in the three years before the application. Moreover, several countries (e.g. 
USA and Canada) offer immediate permanent residence in the form of green cards, 
and EU citizens enjoy free movement and permanent residence rights from day one. 
Consequently, we do still find some naturalisation policies that have strong elements 
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of automatic naturalisation. No countries, however, have adopted the model of 
discounting-conditional naturalisation that we propose.   
Before we flesh out the model for discounting-conditional 
naturalisation, it will be useful to attend to the normative arguments we have at our 
disposal when choosing our approach to naturalisation. As we shall come to see, the 
discussion of naturalisation revolves around a pool of normative reasons, the 
relevance of which theorists generally accept, and the decision to defend either 
automatic or conditional naturalisation is caused by attaching different weightings to 
these reasons. As insightfully captured by Rogers Smith, ‘political debates in most 
states will probably include appeals to some version of all these positions and more’ 
(Smith, 2017: 824). As we shall propose, this weighing of reasons against each other 
is less necessary than normally believed, since our model for discounting-conditional 
naturalisation elegantly complies with the complete system of normative reasons. The 
next section presents an overview of the dominant arguments, which seem to point us 
in both directions. However, if we accept, as most do, that there are both good rights-
based arguments for automatic naturalisation and good duty-based arguments for 
conditional naturalisation, we are left in a deadlock. We can leave this deadlock, 




Although questions related to the status of citizenship are certainly a hot-button topic 
in academia as well as in politics, some consensus has emerged among political 
theorists on the acceptance of the following two simple theses: 
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1. The inclusion thesis: Immigrants who are lawful, long-term residents in a 
state territory should be naturally included as citizens of that state. 
 
2. The adaptation thesis: Immigrants who are lawful, long-term residents in a 
state territory should make an effort to adapt themselves to the social and 
political circumstances of that state.  
 
Despite disagreement on why long-term immigrants should naturally be included as 
citizens and on what that entails morally and politically, the vast majority of theorists 
accept the inclusion thesis as it stands. Similarly, most theorists accept some version 
of the adaptation thesis, and typically based on some version of duties stemming from 
the importance of social cohesion. Thus, we shall not question the inclusion thesis nor 
the adaptation thesis here. Rather, we shall treat them both as central assumptions of 
our argument. The root of disagreement in the literature about naturalisation is that the 
inclusion thesis and the adaptation thesis come apart in that they figure as stepping 
stones for two separate and allegedly incompatible arguments for models of 
naturalisation. One line of argument (left-hand side of table 1) emphasizes the 
inclusion thesis and proceeds by elaborating reasons for accepting it, upon which it 
concludes in favour of automatic naturalisation. The other line of argument stresses 
the importance of the adaptation thesis, proceeds by establishing reasons to support 
that, and then concludes in favour of conditional naturalisation. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
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Since there is agreement about the inclusion and the adaptation thesis, we shall not 
discuss Premise (1) in the two arguments. We simply assume that they are both true. 
Instead, our analysis considers Premises (2) and (3) of both arguments – that is, first, 
the reasons why we should accept the two theses, and what that implies for the 
process of naturalisation. In this section, we flesh out the different arguments that 
have been unfolded to fill out Premise (2) in both arguments. The inclusion thesis is 
grounded in a rights-based foundation, while the adaptation thesis is grounded in a 
duty-based foundation. These two grounds are non-exclusive in that it is both possible 
and very often reasonable to hold them both in some form. Yet to understand what 
kind of reasoning theorists apply to uphold the inclusion thesis and the adaptation 
thesis, it is useful to distinguish between these two types of foundations. Our ultimate 
aim here is not to dispute any of the reasons grounding the two theses, but rather to 
show that the wide pool of reasons employed in both lines of argument do not commit 
one to any of the suggested implications expressed in Premise (3). Rather, we argue, 
the wide range of reasons taken together point to a mid-fare solution that involves 
elements of both automatic and conditional naturalisation. This is the model we call 
discounting-conditional naturalisation.  
In the following, we present the most common reasons that political 
theorists discuss: three rights-based arguments (democratic inclusion, respect and 
special ties) that point towards automatic naturalisation and two duty-based arguments 
(contribution and social cohesion) that point towards conditional naturalisation.  
 
Democratic inclusion 
One prominent argument for immigrants’ right to citizenship is the argument of 
democratic inclusion. Dahl famously defended his principle of full inclusion, from 
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which it follows that all adults who are habitually residents within a territory are 
entitled to full inclusion in the political association of that territory, because they are 
‘subject to the binding collective decisions of the association’ (Dahl, 1989: 129). For 
Dahl, it is a natural implication of democracy that adult habitants within the 
democratic territory have a say in important matters, and thus seemingly we can 
deduce the right of long-term immigrants almost from the conceptual meaning of 
democracy. Walzer proceeds along the same line in his statement that ‘No democratic 
state can tolerate the establishment of a fixed status between citizen and foreigner’ as 
it would amount to political tyranny (Walzer, 1983: 60). Like Dahl, Walzer here 
refers to the inherent inclusiveness of democracy as a share of collective political 
power. Rubio Marin and Carens further argue that democratic inclusion commits us to 
automatic naturalisation because the democratic majority lacks moral entitlement to 
exclude long-term residents from participating in the political community based on 
cultural norms regarding knowledge and behaviour (Rubio Marin, 2000; Carens, 
2005; 2013). Miller and Hampshire, although they reject the claim that democratic 
states are morally entitled to grant citizenship automatically for other reasons, also 
accept that the logic of the democratic state points towards inclusion (Hampshire, 
2010; Miller, 2008). Miller even argues that it intuitively appears to be morally wrong 
if someone residing habitually in a territory does not have their interest taken into 
account (Miller, 2008). 
 Most recently, De Schutter and Ypi provide even further moral 
justification for the democratic inclusion argument by unfolding it within the 
framework of fairness and anti-discrimination (De Schutter and Ypi, 2015). They 
claim, alongside Miller and Walzer, that not including long-term immigrants in the 
citizenry ‘implicitly legitimizes laws that do not treat everyone as equal and threatens 
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to absolve the apartheid-like condition of those who are not offered an equal say in 
the making of laws to which they are subjected’ (De Schutter and Ypi, 2015: 244). 
Hence, from this line of argument, not only does democracy require inclusion of 
immigrants, as Dahl emphasized, and not only does it seem intuitively wrong to 
abolish this democratic requirement, as Miller noted; it is moreover simply an 
instance of unjust discrimination to host long-term immigrants without granting them 
citizenship. 
 The tenet of the democratic inclusion argument holds that immigrants 
have a right to citizenship because it is importantly undemocratic to exclude them 
from the political community, and undemocratic political arrangements are morally 
problematic. Hence, the argument from democratic inclusion provides a weighty pro 
tanto reason why long-term immigrants should receive citizenship automatically in 
their country of long-term residence. However, it is possible to decouple political 
rights such as voting and running for office from citizenship. In this case, democratic 
inclusion could be realised without naturalisation.2 Yet as long as such rights remain 




Another argument that feeds the rights-based premise claims that we owe long-term 
immigrants the status of citizenship out of our duty of respect for others. This 
argument builds on a line of reasoning from theorists such as Axel Honneth and 
Nancy Fraser who, although in slightly different ways, both defend the importance of 
                                                 
2 Beckman (2006) argues from democratic inclusion that political rights should not be reserved for 
citizens. 
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recognition for social justice (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Both, in a similar vein, 
hinge on ideas from the much-related framework of relational egalitarianism, which 
takes the aim of justice to be the securement of equal and respectful relations between 
individuals (Anderson, 1999; Scheffler, 2003). 
The respect argument takes off from the moral assumption that we have 
a duty – of justice, some would claim – to respect other individuals. This duty is non-
reciprocal in that although this duty also entails that others respect you, the respect 
owed to others from you does not depend on their reciprocal respect for you (Seglow, 
2009). Hence, respect for other persons, simply due to their equal moral standing 
grounded in personhood, is an omnipresent, self-standing moral demand. Upon this 
assumption, the respect argument proceeds with the claim that not granting long-term 
immigrants the status of citizenship is a case of failing to live up to the duty of respect 
for their personhood. This is so because citizenship ‘does not simply involve enjoying 
some extra rights denied to non-citizens; at root it involves having a standing which 
non-citizens (including citizens in other states) lack’ (Seglow, 2009: 797). The respect 
argument thus feeds into the rights-based premise of the argument, and thus justifies 
the inclusion thesis (Seglow, 2009; Mason, 2014). As nicely summarized by Seglow, 
the respect argument appeals ‘to the moral wrong involved in withholding the title of 
citizenship to those who have, by virtue of their residence, almost all the rights of 
citizenship, and it says that this sends migrants a message of disrespect’ (Seglow, 
2009: 798).  
 
Special ties 
In addition to democratic inclusion and respect, theorists often strengthen the grounds 
for the inclusion thesis by referring to the special ties that immigrants grow over time 
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to the society in which they reside. Carens especially emphasizes this in the form of 
his social ties argument (Carens, 2005; 2013). ‘As adult immigrants settle into their 
new home’, Carens argues, ‘they become involved in a network of relationships that 
multiply and deepen over time’ (Carens, 2013: 50). At some point, the immigrant 
passes a threshold at which their interests in living in their new society are so strong 
that they are de facto members and therefore are entitled to citizenship. Children of 
citizens, Carens observes, require automatic citizenship at birth. They do so because 
we assume for them a strong social tie as they grow into societal membership. There 
is no reason not to assume the same for children of long-term immigrants. However, if 
that is so, we should acknowledge that even first-generation immigrants also grow 
social ties, and thus the longer the residence the weightier their normative demand for 
citizenship.  
Other theorists similarly emphasise the importance of the growing of 
special ties over time. Recent work within republican political theory similarly argues 
that length of residence is likely to correlate with the exit costs of leaving the country 
because one’s life becomes rooted in the new territory. This gradually makes 
immigrants more vulnerable to domination because denizenship is a status that the 
state can forcibly transform. Thus, as time goes by, immigrants have a stronger claim 
to citizenship because their vulnerability increases (Benton, 2014; Hovdal-Moan, 
2014).  
Alongside the development of social ties over time, Rogers Smith 
observes that nation-states significantly contribute to the shaping of identities of 
people subjected to their coercive institutional structures and policies. This has 
implications, Smith concludes, for the right to citizenship for all ‘quasi-citizens’ 
(Smith 2017). The longer time of residence in a democratic nation-state, the more 
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people will be subject to social institutions and policies that will shape their identities, 
and through this coercive constitution over time, their right to citizenship grows 
stronger. Thus, particularly for immigrants, the implication is that length of residence 
determines the strength of the moral claim for citizenship. As Smith concludes, ‘the 
principle elaborated here implies that long-term resident aliens have very strong 
claims to citizenship indeed’ (2017: 830). 
The special ties argument takes side with the democratic inclusion 
argument but is clearly distinct. Where the democratic inclusion argument grounds a 
right to citizenship immediately simply qua residence, the special ties argument tells 
us that the normative justification of this right grows stronger as length of residence 
increases.  
 
Contributory reciprocity and duties 
There is another well-known argument that, like the argument above, stresses the right 
of immigrants to acquire citizenship, but only on the condition of a necessary 
contribution on their part. This is known as the contribution argument (Seglow, 2009: 
790),  and although it is rarely discussed in the academic debate, it is a common staple 
of national public debates. The contribution argument entails that long-term 
immigrants have a right to be included as citizens of the state in which they reside, but 
only because they made an effort to contribute to that society. That is, the host state 
now owes immigrants the status of citizenship out of its duty of moral reciprocity. 
This argument therefore feeds into the rights-based side of the ecumenical argument, 
but only conditionally; and before doing so, it feeds in a more direct fashion into the 
duty-based side. That is, before the immigrants deserve the right to citizenship from 
contributory reciprocity, there comes a duty to actually contribute to society in the 
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host state. The duty to contribute must employ a fairly broad conception of 
contribution, so that it is not only taxation contributions from paid work, but likewise 
the social contribution of non-working parents in taking care of their children; and 
voluntary social-beneficial work (Seglow, 2009: 791). If contribution is taken 
narrowly to only include taxation contributions, the opportunity to fulfil this duty 
would be unfairly discriminatory.      
 
Social cohesion 
The most common concern about automatic citizenship is that it runs the risk of 
threatening social cohesion. The social cohesion concern is widely shared, but is 
nicely captured in its general form by Sune Lægaard in the following standardization: 
(i) Social cohesion is a political value; (ii) easy access to citizenship through 
naturalisation disrupts social cohesion; (iii) therefore, there is a pro tanto reason to 
strengthen conditions for citizenship through naturalisation (Lægaard, 2010). This is a 
general form of the argument which can be fleshed out in several more specific terms, 
but even in its general version, it is clear that it serves to ground and place weight on 
the adaptation thesis. Most commonly, we see the social cohesion argument fleshed 
out in more specific terms, distinguishing between cultural and political cohesion, to 
capture the value-base for Premise (2).  
Liberal nationalists such as David Miller and Will Kymlicka have a 
cultural reading of the premise and argue that social justice and democracy are 
strengthened by a common public culture and shared national identity, and are thus 
possibly threatened by the cultural heterogeneity that automatic naturalisation would 
bring about (Kymclika, 2001: 334-335; Kymlicka, 2006; Miller, 2008; 1995). 
Conditional naturalisation can be justified to the extent that it promotes a shared 
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public culture and national identity without compromising liberal principles (Hansen, 
2010; Kymlicka, 2001: 39-41). On a political reading of the premise, the social 
cohesion argument stresses the necessity of wide political participation, and from that, 
the duty this places on immigrants to take upon themselves the responsibility of 
political agency that is immanent in the exercise of citizenship (Hampshire, 2010: 84-
86; Mason, 2014; Miller, 2008; Lægaard, 2010; De Schutter and Ypi, 2015). This is 
plausible because the political responsibilities in voting, deliberating and forming 
qualified, impartial opinions about key public issues is among the core civic qualities 
that underlie a stable, well-functioning democracy and the securing of mutual liberty 
(Honohan, 2010; Kymlicka, 2001: 294-300). Of course, this also places a duty (and a 
corresponding right) on immigrants to engage in learning the language and some form 
of civic education in order to acquire the necessary capabilities for exercising good 
citizenship (Hampshire, 2010: 88-89; Miller, 2008: 385). 
There is another way to unfold the social cohesion argument in defence 
of conditional naturalisation. In reference to Elizabeth Anderson's relational 
egalitarianism, it is of central importance for social integration that people from 
different significant groups are able to participate on terms of equality in all societal 
domains (Anderson, 2010: 16-21). In so far as the conditions for naturalisation are 
designed so as to facilitate a social basis for equal participation, conditional 
naturalisation would be defendable, and even preferable, on this account.  
Even the strongest proponents of automatic naturalisation accept social 
cohesion arguments in one form or the other (Carens, 2005: 385; De Schutter and Ypi, 
2015: 246-47; Honohan, 2010). Commonly, this social cohesion argument leads 
theorists to defend conditional naturalisation, where citizenship is granted only on the 
condition of passing certain integration requirements, but this need not be the case. De 
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Schutter and Ypi argue that the social cohesion argument, when accepted alongside 
the democratic inclusion argument, moves us towards mandatory citizenship that will 
not only grant immigrants citizenship automatically but also demand that the 
appropriate political duties are placed upon them (De Schutter and Ypi, 2015: 248). 
 
TOWARDS DISCOUNTING-CONDITIONAL NATURALISATION 
As introduced above, many political theorists struggle to make a choice between 
automatic or conditional naturalisation because they cannot wholly dismiss either 
rights-based or duty-based arguments as relevant and legitimate. Automatic 
naturalisation has obvious advantages since what immigrants are owed in the name of 
justice is here immediately given to them without discrimination, disrespect or lack of 
democratic inclusion. Yet opening up for unrestricted inclusion of immigrants would 
likely come at some cost to social cohesion and would arguably put significantly 
milder pressure on immigrants to fulfil their duties as reciprocal contributors to a 
society’s values. Conditional naturalisation, on the other hand, gives immigrants 
incentives to make an effort to live up to civic duties. Yet it will also very often 
threaten immigrants' rights to inclusion, because the conditions need to be relatively 
demanding, and the distribution of citizenship will be unfair as immigrants will have 
different dispositions for meeting the demands. Thus, the reasons grounding the 
inclusion thesis and the adaptation thesis, respectively, cannot work together in favour 
of any of these two models of naturalisation. 
Instead, we propose a model – illustrated by the figure below – that 
combines automatic and conditional elements, making it possible to accommodate 
both the inclusion and adaptation theses. This is possible because automatic and 
conditional naturalisation are not conceptual opposites. As noted earlier, automatic is 
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not the same as unconditional, since it can incorporate requirements that call for 
minimal effort (such as waiting). It is indeed possible to construct a model in which it 
is possible to acquire permanent residence and citizenship by either waiting or by 
fulfilling certain integration requirements. However, if integration requirements are to 
be effective (i.e., create an incentive), something would have to be gained by fulfilling 
them. We propose that a shortened waiting period should be granted in return. Thus, if 
one can fulfil certain requirements, one can acquire permanent residence or 
citizenship earlier than those who cannot. However, everybody has the choice of 
waiting. Ultimately, everyone will have the possibility of naturalisation. Not least, 
everyone will know that the system aims at inclusion, sending a strong welcoming 
signal to immigrants.  
Finally, for two reasons, we propose having the integration requirements 
decrease in demandingness over time until the point at which nothing is required. 
First, because the claim to citizenship from democratic inclusion, respect, and special 
ties gain strength as the period of residence increases while the other duty-based 
arguments do not (they might even loose strength). Second, because all immigrants, 
independent of their dispositions, should have a reasonable chance to shorten their 
waiting period and receive their new status as a recognition of their own effort – 
although those less able to fulfil the initial, more demanding requirements will have to 
wait longer. This arguably makes it a more meaningful experience.3  
On the face of it, this might appear counter-intuitive; at least in the case 
of linguistic competence and knowledge of society, which, in the normal course of 
                                                 
3 We recognize that it is likely contentious to say that it is a more meaningful experience. Randall 
Hansen argues that humans ‘value that for which we have worked more than that which is handed to 
us’ (Hansen, 2010: 26).  
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things, increases over time. Hence, as language and knowledge improves, 
requirements are relaxed. Yet, this only serves to strengthen the model, because both 
of these developments makes permanent residence and citizenship more accessible. 
What would in fact be counter-intuitive is if requirements were strengthened in 
tandem with immigrants becoming more socially integrated. 
 
 [INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
Our model of naturalisation suggests that ultimately permanent residence and 
citizenship should be automatically granted (Time 5 and Time 9 in the model, 
respectively) but that immigrants can shorten their waiting period by fulfilling certain 
requirements, the demandingness of which decrease over time. Here we only present 
the general blueprint. The model does not specify the exact initial demandingness of 
the integration requirements, nor which requirements should be used and exactly how 
much they should decrease in demandingness with each drop in the model. However, 
some criteria apply. First, the requirements used must be of a type that immigrants can 
accommodate by effort and are relevant for social cohesion. Thus, a language or 
employment requirement might be relevant while it is irrelevant and unfair to require, 
for example, specific blood ancestry. Second, the demandingness of requirements will 
depend on the extent of assistance immigrants receive from the state. All else equal, 
immigrants who receive considerable, easily accessible state assistance – e.g., 
language and job training – have a greater chance of fulfilling certain requirements 
compared to those who receive little assistance. Hence, what is reasonable for states 
to require after a certain period of residence depends on the level of assistance offered 
immigrants. 
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 In addition, the model does not specify the exact length of residence 
before one can apply the first time (Time 1 in the model), the precise time intervals 
between each decrease in the demandingness of integration requirements (1 time unit 
in the figure for permanent residence; 2 time units for citizenship), the exact length of 
residence after which these legal statuses should be granted automatically (Times 5 
and 9 in the model, respectively), nor whether naturalisation should be voluntary or 
mandatory in the end.  
However, we do believe that the waiting period must be within certain 
boundaries in order to accommodate the democratic inclusion, respect, and special 
ties arguments. Moreover, every immigrant should have a reasonable chance to 
naturalize by meeting requirements before being entitled to naturalize. As argued 
above, this offers them the chance of receiving citizenship as a recognition of their 
own effort.  
For example, Austrian citizenship law, which actually incorporates 
discounting in their model, operates with three thresholds: six years of residence for 
those who have made special efforts to integrate (e.g., having obtained a B2 language 
exam), 10 years for regular naturalization (one requirement is a B1 language exam) 
and entitlement to naturalization after 30 years residence. Thus, the Austrian rules 
reduce the demandingness of requirements over time to the point, after 30 years, of 
automatic naturalisation. Does this comply with our model? We believe not. Firstly, 
because the claim to citizenship from democratic inclusion, respect, and special ties 
arguably gain considerable strength well before 30 years of residence – on this, we 
join sides with Rogers Smith who concedes that, ‘just how long ‘long-term’ must be 
in order to justify assigning the state an obligation to confer citizenship, should it be 
desired, is a matter of judgement. But it is reasonable to hold that those resident half a 
24 
decade or more have weighty claims’ (Smith 2017: 830). And secondly, because the 
Austrian rules do not allow all immigrants a reasonable chance to naturalize by 
meeting requirements since the requirements after 10 years of residence are still quite 
demanding. 
 Our model embeds integration requirements into a naturalisation process 
that is inherently inclusionary but does not commit to citizenship being mandatory. In 
the end, everyone will be given the opportunity to be included with the full rights of 
citizenship (perhaps except serial criminal offenders), secure from deportation and 
with the legal opportunity to participate in national politics. This sends a clear signal 
of respect since all know, from day one, that ultimately no lack of ability or personal 
circumstances can deny immigrants access to equal legal standing and democratic 
participation. Moreover, the model fits nicely with the special ties argument, such as 
fleshed out by Carens’ social ties or Smith’s coercively constituted identities, since 
the demandingness of integration requirements decreases over time in correlation with 
the cost for the immigrant of exiting the country as her social network and life 
prospects become increasingly tied to the country with the passage of time. However, 
the model also rewards ability and effort to integrate by reducing the residence 
requirement if certain integration requirements are fulfilled. This communicates, 
clearly and strongly, what civic qualities the national community particularly values 
and what it expects of immigrants in terms of adaptation. 
 In addition, the model seems to strengthen the social ties argument in a 
way that automatic naturalisation would not. Oberman (2017) argues that there is not 
a determinate relationship between length of residence and strength of social ties. 
Tourists, for example, might develop a social network and learn the language through 
repeated visits, while a long-term immigrant would not. However, integration 
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requirements will facilitate the establishment of certain kind of social ties that tourists 
and other transients cannot readily develop. Through participation in language 
programs, job training, and civic education immigrants form ties of interest and 
identity to the state, civil society and the job market. That is, ties that are not just 
about language and social network, which the socially minded, revisiting tourist can 
quickly develop. The model we propose aims to strengthen the social ties of 
immigrants, thus bolstering their claim to citizenship, while at the same time 
respecting the other right-based arguments by ultimately granting automatic access. 
The combination of automatic and conditional elements naturally 
involves some degree of balancing between the values underlying the right-based and 
duty-based arguments. For instance, while a right-based defence of automatic 
naturalisation might offer citizenship after a relatively short period of residence, our 
model is committed to prolonging this period in order to make room for the 
integration requirements to serve the interest of the value of social cohesion. Hence, 
from a pure right-based perspective, the model seems to imply a necessary backlash 
of injustice. However, as the model is designed in the spirit of value pluralism – and is 
still a significantly improvement of justice in comparison to conditional naturalisation 
– this is no theoretical embarrassment.  
Moreover, one independent argument in support of this model, which is 
different from the argument present in the literature on naturalisation but lends itself 
easily to considerations of fairness, is Fishkin's ‘Bottlenecks’ conception of equal 
opportunity as opportunity pluralism. In a nutshell, opportunity pluralism involves 
creating access to social goods through more than one route, so as to allow for people 
with different dispositions to gain more equal opportunities at a general level 
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(Fishkin, 2014: 16-17). This is exactly what the model for discounting-conditional 
naturalisation allows. 
Discounting-conditional naturalisation is not a complete ideal-theory 
about citizenship or immigration. It is a suggestion for how to reconcile the ideal-
theoretical reasons for acceptance of the inclusion thesis and the adaptation thesis, 
respectively. Consequently, it will not necessarily be the most ideal model of 
naturalisation – at least, we cannot argue that it should be. More modestly, we claim 
that the model is more aligned with the various reasons in the literature on 
naturalisation than its competitors are. 
 
POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
One might oppose this model for several reasons. Here we try to anticipate some. 
Specifically, that the model assumes no scarcity of citizenship; that it threatens social 
cohesion; that it gives unfair priority to the talented and well educated; that it conflicts 
with rules giving those with close ethnic or cultural ties easier access to citizenship; 
and, finally, that conditional naturalisation with the possibility of dispensation 
accomplishes the same. The following discusses them in this order. 
As we have laid out the model here, we assume that there is no scarcity 
of citizenship – that is, we assume that granting all applicants unrestricted access to 
naturalisation after a certain length of residence will not overload the system and 
necessitate a preliminary prioritization between lawfully habitual residents about who 
will be allowed to apply. Although perhaps controversial, we do not believe the no 
scarcity assumption to be implausible. First, permanent residence and citizenship are 
non-rivalrous goods, meaning that granting such legal statuses to immigrants does not 
reduce the availability of the rights attached to others. Remember, no significant 
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social rights are attached to these legal statuses. Consequently, government 
expenditure does not increase by granting them and therefore no increase in taxes or 
reduction in benefits will result. Second, one could also believe that there is relevant 
scarcity in terms of the bureaucratic resources needed to process the applications. 
However, the case handling process is typically slowed down by qualifications that 
are difficult to document. This often has to do with establishing the identity of the 
immigrant because of missing or flawed documentation. It is generally not the case 
that qualifications attained in the receiving country (such as passing a language test or 
being employed for a certain amount of time) are difficult to document. Our model 
only pertains to the latter kind of documentation. Still, the naturalisation practice we 
envision might increase the number of applications, which might make it necessary to 
employ more caseworkers. This we see as a rather uncontroversial implication.  
We also assume that our model will not relevantly threaten social 
cohesion. This is an empirical assumption that needs justification, but again, we think 
that it is highly plausible. The argument, on a cultural understanding of cohesion, 
could be that the model increases cultural diversity by making permanent residence 
and citizenship possible without (documented) adaptation. The assumption is that 
immigrants would rather wait for a longer period than try to accommodate integration 
requirements and that immigrants under conditional naturalisation will make a greater 
effort to adapt. Putting aside the question of whether cultural diversity is problematic 
(and at what level), existing studies, although few, are rather inconclusive on the 
effects of conditional naturalisation. Countries with more restrictive requirements do 
not seem to experience higher levels of national belonging, trust or employment 
among immigrants (see e.g., Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2011; Goodman and Wright, 
2015). Thus, we have no reason to believe that motivation to adapt increases under 
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conditional naturalisation. Moreover, it seems equally plausible that immigrants 
would be more motivated to fulfil integration requirements if packaged in a clearly 
inclusionary model since there is no mistaking the intentions behind the rules. 
A third objection could be that the model unfairly prioritizes the talented 
and the well-educated. By allowing a shorter residence requirement for those able and 
willing to accommodate certain integration requirements, the talented and well-
educated are given a quicker route to the security and stability that permanent 
residence and citizenship offer. This is unfair because the less talented and educated 
might reasonably be so because of circumstances outside their control. Admittedly, 
offering conditions that favour some groups with certain characteristics over others 
does indeed set up a deservingness hierarchy, and since acquiring citizenship provides 
significant benefits, those who acquire it before others can accumulate advantages 
over a period. Hence, to the extent that the ability to fulfil integration requirements is 
independent of effort, such requirements should not guard access to permanent 
residence and citizenship. This is a strong principled objection, and our model will 
have to bite this bullet some of the way. However, our model does protect fairness in 
the sense that it will serve to secure effective access to citizenship for everyone and 
only on reasonable conditions – e.g., simply being a resident for a certain period of 
time. And, more particularly, in one respect the model directly serves fairness – or at 
least the part of fairness that refers to equality of opportunity, as explained in 
reference to Fishkin, by offering opportunity pluralism and hence lowering the 
pressure on the bottleneck for citizenship. Indeed, it seems doubtful that the fairness 
concern could be better accommodated by alternative models, without whole-
heartedly disregarding the normative concerns on the other side, such as of social 
cohesion. Certainly, granting citizenship to immigrants by flipping a coin would in 
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principle be more fair, as it gives everyone an equal chance at the good, but for 
several reasons it is not the appropriate policy for naturalisation. It seems, then, that 
fairness is appropriate here only in balance with other normative concerns, and this is 
perfectly captured by the model of discounting-conditional naturalisation. 
A possible fourth objection is that the model cannot collaborate with 
existing rules that prioritize non-citizen applicants with special ties by giving them 
easier access to citizenship – for example, those with close ethnic or cultural ties, 
certain family migrants or applicants of particular wanted professions. If countries 
wish to maintain special priorities for some particular applicants, it is important to 
note, firstly, that the model could be implemented as only part of the naturalisation 
system. Secondly, however, we suggest that the model of discounting-conditional 
naturalisation ought to replace such group-specific rules. Both because it would make 
the naturalisation process more fair and transparent, and because the model leaves no 
reason for prioritizing special ties. Rather than simply assuming that special ethnic, 
cultural, family or professional ties facilitate an easier process of integration, the 
model allows for special priority but only when this assumption is shown to be 
evidently true. In other words, if the process of integration is quicker and easier for 
immigrants with special ties, it should be easier for such immigrants to meet the 
discounting conditions, and thus the model will reward such applicants with a 
proportionally reduced waiting period. 
The last objection we will consider here is that combining conditional 
naturalisation with extended possibilities for dispensation will be just as good a model 
as the one we propose. In fact, all Western countries today allow for dispensation 
from integration requirements if the applicant can document that it is entirely beyond 
their abilities to accommodate one or more of the requirements. This will often have 
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to do with serious physical or mental illness. However, if dispensation were possible 
for those who could demonstrate that they had indeed made a significant effort, 
relative to their abilities, to fulfil the integration requirements without being able to, 
would that not accomplish the same as our model? This solution, although preferable 
to conditional naturalisation with limited dispensation opportunities, is still 
problematic. First, the decision to grant dispensation will to a certain extent be 
discretionary, introducing concerns regarding arbitrariness and discrimination. Public 
servants tasked with deciding on dispensation would have to evaluate whether or not 
the applicant had indeed done all in her power to fulfil the integration requirements. 
This evaluation cannot avoid being discretionary to a certain extent. Thus, different 
public servants could possibly reach different conclusions on rather similar cases, and 
implicit or explicit bias towards certain types of applicants may affect their judgment 
without it being traceable in the final decision. Second, this solution is not inherently 
inclusionary, unlike the model we propose. It is highly likely that, even with 
expanding the dispensation opportunities, there will remain a group of immigrants not 
eligible for dispensation because they cannot convince the state that they have indeed 
done all in their power to meet the requirements. Thus, this solution will likely result 




If people agree about the relevant normative arguments related to a specific policy 
area, it seems peculiar that there should be strong normative disagreement on what is 
the appropriate political arrangement. Nonetheless, this seems to be the case with 
regard to naturalisation policy. This is what has intrigued us into providing the 
31 
argument in this paper. Our central claim, restated, was that the normative reasons 
people refer to in defence of opposite naturalisation policies – democratic inclusion, 
respect, special ties, contributory reciprocity, and social cohesion – are not necessarily 
in opposition, and we have argued that the model of discounting-conditional 
naturalisation consistently complies with this complete set of normative reasons. It 
seems thus that our proposal in this article – that we employ the model of discounting-
conditional naturalisation as our policy for granting citizenship – seems elegantly to 
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Table 1. The two ecumenical arguments 
The automatic naturalisation argument   
1. The inclusion thesis: Immigrants 
who are lawful, long-term residents 
in a state territory should be 
naturally included as citizens of that 
state. 
2. This is so because long-term 
immigrants have a right to 
citizenship towards the state. 
3. Therefore, long-term immigrants 
should be granted citizenship 
automatically. 
The conditional naturalisation argument 
1. The adaptation thesis: Immigrants 
who are lawful, long-term residents 
in a state territory should make an 
effort to adapt themselves to the 
social and political circumstances of 
that state.  
2. This is so because long-term 
immigrants have civic duties 
towards the state. 
3. Therefore, long-term immigrants 





Figure 1. Illustration of the model for discounting-conditional naturalisation 
 
